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Abstract: Institutions undertake a huge variety of constitutive 
purposes. One of the roles of legitimacy is to protect and promote an 
institution’s pursuit of its purpose; state legitimacy is generally 
understood as the right to rule, for example. When considering 
legitimacy beyond the state, we have to take account of how 
differences in purposes change legitimacy. I focus in particular on 
how differences in purpose matter for the stringency of the standards 
that an institution must meet in order to be legitimate. An important 
characteristic of an institution’s purpose is its deontic status, i.e. 
whether it is morally impermissible, merely permissible, or 
mandatory. Although this matters, it does so in some non-obvious 
ways; the mere fact of a morally impermissible purpose is not 
necessarily delegitimating, for example. I also consider the problem of 
conflicting, multiple, and contested institutional purposes, and the 
different theoretical roles for institutional purpose. Understanding 
how differences in purpose matter for an institution’s legitimacy is 
one part of the broader project of theorizing institutional legitimacy in 
the many contexts beyond the traditional context of the state. 
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The purpose of the state matters a great deal for the debate over state legitimacy. 
The most basic conflicts between political anarchists, statists, and cosmopolitans, 
for example, often comes down to whether or not the state is actually necessary or 
sufficient for achieving some purpose. Within statism, Rawlsian political liberals 
reject any perfectionist aim, libertarians claim that the state can only undertake 
minimal functions, and so on. How we conceive of the purpose of the state 
matters for our understanding of the state’s legitimacy at a fundamental level. 
 In this article I explore how institutional purpose matters for institutional 
legitimacy in general.1 Most discussions of legitimacy consider a bundle of 
specified institutional features that characterizes a particular institution or 
institutional type (Collingwood and Logister 2005, Sangiovanni 2013). For 
example, the state’s purpose is often considered alongside how it uses coercion 
and claims authority. Thus it is often difficult to see the role that purpose plays 
apart from other features of the institution. While complete theories of legitimacy 
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eventually need to account for the bundle of features as an interdependent whole, 
it also helps to theorize the features independently of one another.  
Such independent theorizing is especially important as we develop 
theories of legitimacy for new varieties of institutions, especially beyond the state. 
Having theorized the features independently, we will be able to see more clearly 
how they interact in unique combination. We will also be better able to investigate 
whether theories developed for particular institutions are applicable more broadly. 
For example, it is an open question whether democratic conceptions of state 
legitimacy are appropriate for institutions that differ drastically with respect to 
purpose, means, and other features. This is true of political institutions above the 
state, like the United Nations, the European Union, or institutions with more 
specific remits, like the World Trade Organization. Answering whether or to what 
extent democratic standards apply to such institutions requires us to investigate 
how particular features of institutions matter for legitimacy, both independently 
and in various combinations. My goal here is to show a number of complex ways 
that institutional purpose matters for legitimacy, although complete consideration 
of even this one feature is beyond the scope of this article.  
 Here is the plan. In the first section I sketch an account of institutions and 
institutional legitimacy, showing how general features of institutions establish a 
prima facie justificatory baseline. In the second section I consider how the deontic 
status of an institution’s purpose matters for its legitimacy. In section three I 
complicate matters, considering how degree of achievement of purpose matters 
and distinguishing extant purpose from hypothetical justificatory purpose. In 
section four I raise a variety of problems for theorizing extant purpose. Finally, in 
a brief concluding section, I suggest a way forward with a more minimalist 
understanding of institutional legitimacy.  
 
I. Institutions and Legitimacy 
 
In the sense I am concerned with, institutions primarily consist of two elements: 
norms that define various institutional roles or offices and individuals who accept 
the norms, thereby occupying roles (Miller 2009, p. 25). By defining the roles in a 
coherent way, institutions are able to carry out their most basic function of 
coordinating individuals’ actions.2 While this broad definition might capture 
informal collections of norms, for example “the institution of marriage,” my focus 
here is on more formalized cases. Formalization enables collections of individuals 
to act collectively and so raises the question of the standing to act collectively.  
At its core institutional legitimacy constitutes a normative status or 
standing, which an illegitimate institution of that type lacks.3 For example, state 
legitimacy is usually understood as the right to rule: legitimate states have the 
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right to rule and illegitimate states do not. This standing correlates to a specific 
uptake on the part of others; the right to rule standardly correlates with a duty to 
obey. The right to rule cannot capture the legitimacy of all institutions because 
many do not rule at all. Regardless of the type of institution, though, a legitimate 
token of that type has a standing that illegitimate tokens do not. 
The nature of this standing is tied to legitimacy’s inherently practical role: 
it coordinates our collective responses to institutions in order to enable institutions 
to function (Buchanan 2013, Adams 2018). To call an institution legitimate is to 
ascribe it a standing that defines its relationship to various other individuals and 
groups in such a way as to protect its ability to exist and to function. To call an 
institution illegitimate is to deny that it has such a standing and so to deny it such 
protection.  
For such an evaluation to be coherent, two conceptual preconditions must 
be met. First, there must be a coherent whole that can be evaluated and attributed 
a distinct normative standing qua collective actor. Second, that coherent whole 
must have a constitutive functioning that is protected. We must have a bearer of 
standing and a way to delimit its protections in a principled way. Institutional 
purpose contributes both to organizing a group of people into a coherent whole 
and to defining that group’s constitutive functioning.  
Purpose shapes and structures a collection of norms into a viable whole, 
capable of coordinating individuals. Any collection of norms is bound to have 
conflicts and tensions. There is an indeterminate number of ways that any conflict 
between norms could be resolved. Why should this office or role have these 
powers? Why should it relate to other roles in this way? Without a guide to 
resolve these tensions, the collection will be incoherent, incapable of coordinating 
people in an organized way. The guide is the institution’s purpose.4  
The constitutive functions of an institution are those functions without 
which it could not undertake its defining purpose. It is these functions that are the 
focus of the standing that legitimacy constitutes and so they are a useful criterion 
for individuating distinct institutional types.5 Universities and businesses are 
distinct kinds of institutions primarily because of their distinct purpose and 
constitutive functions. A private home that becomes a museum memorializing its 
famous occupant becomes a new kind of institution because its purpose and 
constitutive functions change.6 
Institutional purpose need not be something that is explicitly and 
intentionally held by all or even any members of the institution; instead it is an 
organizing principle that is required to make sense of any collection of norms as 
being bound together in such a way as to contribute to the constitution of an 
institution. This purpose can be very simple; at the limit, as explored below, an 
institution’s purpose might simply be to share a set of norms. While institutional 
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purpose can be merely implicit or very simple, it is more common for institutional 
purpose to be explicit and to aim at further goals.  
Given that institutions are necessarily directed at and shaped by some 
purpose, the most basic normative question for any given institution is whether it 
is an appropriate tool for achieving the purpose in question. This question admits 
of various interpretations. We might ask whether the institution is the most 
efficient way to achieve some purpose. We might ask whether it is the only way 
to achieve some purpose—whether the state is the only way to achieve justice, for 
example, or whether membership in a particular church is the only way to get into 
right relationship with the divine. Among these interpretation, legitimacy asks: 
does this institution have the right to pursue its purpose? Must we collectively let 
this institution exist and undertake its constitutive functions, or not? 
For an institution to be legitimate must mean that it has the right to exist 
qua means for pursuing its purpose or, as I call it, the right to function. As I 
understand it, the right to function is a claim-right against coercive interference in 
the constitutive functioning of the institution.7 Coercively interfering in the 
constitutive functioning of an institution amounts to preventing it from pursuing 
its purpose and so renders it a non-viable token of its type. Legitimacy, regardless 
of whether we conceive of it as also including anything more robust such as a 
right to rule, must include the right to coordinate people towards achieving some 
purpose.  
In order to inquire into the role of institutional purpose in a relatively 
ecumenical way, here I focus on the right to function as the core of legitimacy on 
any account. Focusing on the right to function allows us to ask the following 
general questions: under what conditions does a group of people have the right to 
accept a set of norms and coordinate their behavior in order to collectively pursue 
some purpose, such that others have a duty not to prevent them from so doing? 
How does the nature of that purpose matter for the conditions under which that 
right can be gained or lost?  
Inquiring into these questions is the task of the rest of the article, informed 
by two important features of institutions in general. First, institutions produce a 
variety of goods by their very nature, including the goods of association, 
cooperation, and organization (Levy 2015). Further, individuals’ fundamental 
rights to self-determination include both the right to free association and the right 
to accept and bide by norms that structure our lives. An institution has a prima 
facie case for its right to function simply because it is a result of the free, 
protected choices of individuals and because it generates certain goods.8  
The strength of this prima facie case is a matter of some contention that I 
do not address here but which matters a great deal for our final understanding of 
the legitimacy of a variety of institutions. One likely implication is worth noting 
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because it also helps clarify the role of institutional purpose. There are many 
institutions that do not seem to have a purpose in the strong sense that, for 
example, we associate with institutions that have mission statements. A 
neighborhood’s social club doesn’t undertake any grand programs. But these 
institutions do have a purpose: organizing people. Regardless of whether they also 
pursue some further purpose, forming an institution allows them to gain the 
benefits of association and cooperation in a structured manner, reliably securing 
various goods. The goods of institutionalization can be the sole purpose of an 
institution. On my reading of the strength of the prima facie case for institutions’ 
right to function, such limited institutions are legitimate ceteris paribus. 
It is worth asking, though, why we should conceive of an institution as the 
result of voluntary choice, and so worthy of the protections we grant such 
choices.9 Some institutions are the result of the voluntary associational choices of 
their members and some are not; membership in the state is most commonly not a 
voluntary act. Of course, when an institution is not voluntary in the right way, this 
raises immense questions for its legitimacy. The question I must address here is a 
methodological one: why take the voluntary institution as the default case, from 
which we construct our initial understanding of legitimacy? We might instead 
take involuntary membership in institutions, like the state or an ethnic group or 
often a religion, to be more fundamental.  
In short, I think that it is much more difficult to make sense of legitimacy 
if we take involuntary membership as the base case. Being involuntarily obligated 
to join some group and to abide by its norms runs directly contrary to liberal 
egalitarian individualism, which is the general normative framework within which 
I am making my argument. Understanding legitimacy is difficult and nuanced 
enough in the case of voluntary institutions that adding the fundamental problem 
of nonvoluntariness seems to make the question profoundly difficult to answer. 
But ultimately I am a methodological pluralist and am happy to admit that every 
starting point, including my own, will illuminate some issues but obscure others.  
 In opposition to the prima face positive case for an institution’s legitimacy 
arising from voluntary choice and freedom of association, there is a prima facie 
negative case because institutions constitute a concentration of power precisely 
because they gather and coordinate the efforts of many individuals. Choosing to 
concentrate any significant amount of power is prima facie unjustified for a 
variety of reasons. One is that concentrating power is risky and people have rights 
against unreasonable levels of risk. Another is that, at least according to some 
views, concentrating power is in itself a harm when it is not controlled, e.g. on 
views which construe freedom as non-domination and domination as arbitrary 
power (e.g. Pettit 1997). So there is also a prima facie case against an institution’s 
right to function because it generates certain risks or harms, some of which others 
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may have rights against. The strength of this case largely depends on the type and 
magnitude of power in question and so on the size and nature of the institution. 
Small social clubs are legitimate ceteris paribus in part because they concentrate 
very little power. With these two baseline elements of the case for institutional 
legitimacy in hand, we turn to the role of purpose. 
 
II. Deontic Status 
 
I noted at the outset that purpose is only one of the features of an institution that 
matters for an institution’s legitimacy. Even narrowing my focus to only one 
feature, here I cannot explain all the ways in which purpose matters for 
legitimacy. For example, it is clear that purpose will shape how an institution 
functions and so what further claims and rights will follow from the more general 
right to function, yet I do not pursue this issue here.10 Instead I focus on only one 
question: how purpose matters for the stringency of the standards that an 
institution must meet to be legitimate. I characterize this as how institutional 
purpose can raise or lower the justificatory bar for the right to function. Some 
purposes—or feature of that purpose—will raise the bar, i.e. an institution with 
that purpose must meet more stringent standards to have the right to function.  
The standards for state legitimacy are more stringent than those for your 
local book club: the justificatory bar for the state’s right to function is higher. The 
state has to separate out its powers, has to consult everyone within its ambit, must 
have limited terms for officials, must explain itself to its members, and so on. 
Your book club doesn’t have to meet those same standards: it doesn’t have to be 
democratic, or even formalized, in order to have the right not to be interfered with 
in pursuing its constitutive purpose. This is intuitively plausible. The question I 
address in this paper is how different institutional purposes matter in this kind of 
way. 
Perhaps the most obvious evaluation we can make of an institution’s 
purpose is in terms of its deontic status: is the purpose morally mandatory, merely 
morally permissible, or morally impermissible? The deontic status of an 
institution’s purpose matters a great deal for its legitimacy. But we should not be 
too quick even at this early stage.  
The first tempting thought is that an institution with a morally 
impermissible purpose is ipso facto illegitimate. This is too quick because of the 
prima facie case for legitimacy that institutions have in virtue of their members’ 
rights to free association and self-determination more generally. This gives some 
weight to letting the institution exist—which is to say, letting members accept 
institutional norms and fulfill institutional roles. This might not be very much 
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weight but it is enough to say that the simple fact of an impermissible purpose is 
not necessarily delegitimating. 
Consider an anti-accountability club: a club that exists to coordinate 
people so that they can more efficiently violate oaths of sexual fidelity. Two facts 
about this social club seem to me to be true: (1) its purpose—more efficient 
breaking of oaths—is morally impermissible but (2) it has a right against coercive 
interference. This is related to the idea that breaking those oaths is impermissible 
but not the sort of wrong that others are justified in coercively preventing. The 
mere fact of impermissibility does not entail the absence of a right against 
interference.11 
In the individual case, this amounts to the claim that people have the right 
to do wrong (Waldron 1981). We have standing self-determination rights not to 
be interfered with which are not forfeit merely because we choose to act 
impermissibly. There are a range of impermissible acts that fall within our realm 
of self-determining choice that rights to non-interference protect. The same holds 
both of institutions qua products of our ongoing choices and of institutions qua 
collective actors. The right to do wrong has multiple grounds: the basic value of 
self-determination, the disvalue of (especially coercive) interference, the value of 
living together in a community of equals who all make mistakes and also all 
disagree, i.e. the demands of the burdens of judgment and pluralism, and so on.  
All that said, the right to do wrong is limited in its scope. An institution 
like the anti-accountability club can be legitimate despite the fact that its purpose 
is impermissible because it is the sort of impermissible purpose that falls within 
the right to do wrong. But clearly many impermissible purposes fall outside the 
scope of the right to do wrong. For such institutions, our initial intuition is correct: 
merely having that purpose renders the institution illegitimate. Human trafficking 
is such a purpose; all institutions that have human trafficking as their purpose are 
necessarily illegitimate (the type is illegitimate). Articulating the principled 
difference between impermissible purposes that are automatically delegitimating 
and those that are not is an important task I cannot undertake here.  
Moving away from impermissible purposes, a merely permissible 
institutional purpose is the standard case and in some ways the easiest to theorize 
on its own. The question is what other features of these institutions could override 
the prima facie case for non-interference grounded in morally permissible, rights-
protected norm-acceptance and free association. For example, two institutions 
with the same purpose of financial gain might differ in their legitimacy because of 
the means they use to pursue that purpose: your local grocer uses fair market 
transactions for financial gain and so is legitimate ceteris paribus, while an 
extortion ring uses threats of egregious unjust harm for financial gain and so is 
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illegitimate. Since our focus is on how institutional purpose matters for 
legitimacy, I leave these issues aside.  
One general point before moving on: the prima facie case for the 
legitimacy of an institution with a permissible purpose has certain implications for 
what could delegitimate. If the prima facie case grounds a right to non-
interference ceteris paribus, the question is how a right to non-interference can be 
forfeit. Rather than simply a balance of costs and benefits, the prima facie case 
shifts the justification into a deontological mode. I understand rights forfeiture to 
depend on culpable wrongdoing: an agent only forfeits a right she has if she 
violates others rights, making her liable to defensive, preventive, or punitive 
interference. So the mere fact that an institution with a permissible purpose is 
inefficient or produces some harms is not necessarily delegitimating. Only 
(sufficiently egregious) rights violations ground a case for illegitimacy.  
 The final possibility with respect to deontic status is that an institution’s 
purpose is morally mandatory. This matters in at least two non-obvious ways. 
There are certainly more. In addition to the particular points I make, these 
arguments show that the role of institutional purpose is sufficiently complex to be 
worthy of independent and detailed treatment. 
First, the normative bar for the legitimacy of an institution with a morally 
mandatory purpose is plausibly lower compared to an otherwise identical 
institution that undertakes a non-mandatory purpose. This may be surprising. It 
may seem that precisely because a morally mandatory purpose is so important, we 
should hold the institution that undertakes it to higher standards. But the idea that 
a morally mandatory purpose lowers the normative bar for justification becomes 
clear once we take seriously the idea that an institution is a tool that is by its 
nature risky.  
 For example, it is unjustifiable for Jane the ambulance driver to vastly 
exceed the speed limit just for fun, primarily because of the risks to bystanders. 
But it is justifiable for Jane to vastly exceed the speed limit when driving a 
seriously injured person to the hospital even if it involves the same level of risk to 
bystanders. Entertainment is a morally permissible goal but cannot justify vast 
speeds given the sorts of risks involved. With respect to the same risks, though, 
the mandatory purpose of rendering life-saving aid renders speeding justifiable.  
 I express this difference as a “lowering” of the justificatory bar or burden 
on speeding. This is to capture the idea that a more demanding purpose can justify 
employing a greater range of means, including riskier means. When Jane is trying 
to save a life, Jane can justifiably impose greater risks on bystanders than she can 
for entertainment. Ceteris paribus, being obligated to act towards some aim means 
that a greater variety of costs, harms, and even wrongs can be risked than when 
merely voluntarily undertaking some aim. In general it is easier to justify risky 
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activities to do more important things. (Parallel points hold for comparisons 
between morally mandatory purposes of different import.) 
 As argued above, the existence and operation of institutions is inherently 
risky because institutions concentrate power and thereby enable much more 
potentially impactful activities. A morally mandatory purpose can justify a riskier 
and even more harmful institution: an institution that is bigger, uses riskier means, 
and even violates rights sometimes. Consider criminal justice institutions, which 
we know will sometimes egregiously wrong people because sometimes innocent 
people are punished. These wrongs do not automatically render such institutions 
illegitimate. If they did, no human criminal justice institution could ever be 
legitimate because all such institutions are fallible. Yet the same fallible punitive 
institution is obviously illegitimate if it is set to purposes other than our most 
demanding and important ones.  
 This example brings us to the second point. A morally mandatory purpose 
makes the question of feasible institutional alternatives relevant (Pogge 2008, pp. 
25, 182). If there is a task that we are obligated to undertake and an institution is 
the only way to undertake it, then there is a very strong case for having an 
institution even if it is quite bad in certain respects. (This does not necessarily 
entail that when we are undertaking morally mandatory tasks, any institution no 
matter how bad would be legitimate if there was no feasible alternative. 
Sometimes the absence of any institution and so the failure to achieve the purpose 
is preferable, with reparative and ameliorative duties becoming the main focus.) 
But just because we need some institution to pursue a particular mandatory 
purpose does not mean any institution which pursues it is legitimate. Its 
legitimacy also depends on comparisons to feasible institutional alternatives. 
 Consider a morally mandatory task like providing medical care to sick 
people. Addressing health on an ad hoc basis is massively inefficient and very 
costly. To provide adequate care to the ill and health security for everyone 
regardless of current health status, we need institutions that train and employ 
medical professionals and are ready to treat people as necessary. Now compare 
the best, most well-funded medical institution in the United States from the mid-
nineteenth century to a medical institution now; in particular consider the sorts of 
treatments that they make available and are competent to deploy. In the past, it 
was infeasible to have anything nearly as effective in treating illness as we have 
today, mostly because of a lack of medical knowledge and technical capacity.  
The standards we hold our medical institutions to depend upon our 
capabilities because capabilities partly determine which institutional alternatives 
are feasible. In the nineteenth century there were no feasible alternatives to, for 
example, palliative care for cancer patients because we didn’t understand cancer 
very well and had no knowably effective treatments. So a medical institution in 
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the mid-nineteenth century that did not have any effective cancer treatments could 
very well be legitimate: it could have the right to carry out its tasks, to serve as a 
cooperative venture with the aim of providing medical care. If we transplant that 
medical institution, with all its capacities and equipment intact, to our time, it is 
illegitimate. The only thing that has changed is that there are now better feasible 
alternatives because we know much more and have much better technology. We 
should not let a medical institution with such poor treatments serve a 
contemporary community because we can (relatively easily) establish an 
alternative institution that serves the same mandatory purpose much better. When 
an institution undertakes a morally mandatory purpose, the importance of 
achieving that purpose can lower the justificatory bar such that the institution can 
be legitimate despite features that would render it illegitimate were there any 
feasible alternative institution for pursuing that purpose without the objectionable 
features. The presence or absence of alternatives can change whether it is 
legitimate. 
On the other hand, when considering a merely morally permissible 
purpose, there is very little reason to have a harmful institution and so the 
presence or absence of feasible institutional alternatives is irrelevant to an 
institution’s legitimacy. Whatever permissible purpose the institution was 
undertaking can by definition permissibly be abandoned since it was not 
obligatory. The features that make it objectionable render it illegitimate even 
when there are no feasible alternatives because the reasons to pursue its purpose 
at all are quite weak. Feasible institutional alternatives only matter for an 
institution’s legitimacy when it is undertaking a morally mandatory purpose. The 
deontic status of an institution’s purpose matters for legitimacy by setting the 
justificatory baseline or bar in a way that no other feature does.  
  
III. Complications 
 
In this section I uncover two complications and show how they need to be 
considered in order for us to more fully understand the role of institutional 
purpose for legitimacy. First, so far I have been relying on an ambiguity regarding 
what it means for an institution to undertake a specific purpose: whether we are 
considering cases where institutions actually achieve their purpose or cases where 
institutions merely attempt to achieve their purpose and may fail. This raises a 
variety of further complexities. 
 First, with respect to certain kinds of impermissible purposes, it may be 
that we only think institutions are legitimate when they mostly fail to achieve 
their purpose. Sometimes this is how we think of authoritarian or anarchist 
political parties in democracies.12 So far as those parties fail to achieve any 
	11		
widespread support and do not threaten the democratic character of the polity, we 
think they should be allowed to carry on despite the fact it would be 
impermissible to bring about authoritarian governance or anarchy. The familiar 
reasons concern the value of free expression and association as well as the 
disvalue of concentrating and exercising power of certain kinds, especially with 
respect to suppressing political views. But it is also plausible to think that should 
such a party gain sufficiently widespread support and begin to achieve its 
purpose, it would be illegitimate and we would be justified in shutting it down 
with coercive force.  
 Second, with respect to merely permissible purposes, degree of 
achievement probably does not matter very much. Whether they succeed or fail 
may matter a great deal for the personal projects of the members, or even the 
community, but their failure does not render them illegitimate because it was up 
to them whether to undertake the purpose in the first place. Things are more 
complicated with respect to mandatory purposes.  
The first thought is that failing at mandatory purposes is particularly 
bad—indeed, by definition wrongful—so institutions that fail to achieve a 
mandatory purpose are prima facie illegitimate. This ignores the fact, though, that 
some purposes are incredibly difficult or necessarily incomplete. I take justice to 
be a purpose with both features: it is almost impossible to do well and is a task 
that has no endpoint because even a just state of affairs needs to be sustained and 
protected intergenerationally, not to mention adaptive to changing contexts. If we 
think perfect—or even close—achievement of mandatory purposes is required for 
legitimacy, then any (human) institution with justice as its purpose will almost 
certainly be illegitimate. We need a more expansive and humanist understanding 
of legitimacy than that. Legitimacy is not an exercise in ideal theory.  
This is not true of all mandatory purposes, some of which may have a 
determinate completion point that is relatively easy to achieve. For such purposes, 
failing to approximate the purpose or even simply failing to achieve it may render 
the institution illegitimate—again, assuming that there is some feasible 
institutional alternative that could do better (which is very likely given an easily 
achieved purpose). To return to a previous example, a contemporary medical 
institution that failed to mend broken bones or cure a common infection would be 
illegitimate because we know how to achieve these ends quite easily; a medical 
institution that failed to cure all kinds of cancer, on the other hand, can still be 
legitimate. 
 The second complication is about the role of purpose in justifying an 
institution and arises from questioning the standard strategy used in theorizing 
state legitimacy. Generally, questions of state legitimacy proceed from a 
description of the defining features of the actual extant institutions that we call 
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states, especially including their relation to the basic structure, claims to authority, 
and widespread use of force. The question is then asked: how could an institution 
with these features actually be justified in some sense?13 Theorists then argue that 
some hypothetical purpose could justify such an institution. This theorizing 
happens at the level of institutional type. The next step is to apply the theory to 
particular institutional tokens, arguing that states that do not undertake the 
justifying purpose or which undertake any other purpose are illegitimate. 
 This picture, even oversimplified in this manner, clearly only works in 
some cases.14 It presumes a stable description of institutional features out of 
which we can construct an institutional type and to which the hypothetical 
purpose is then related. But such stability is not a feature of all institutions. In the 
case of the state, we have data for theorizing in this manner because there are 
hundreds of states and have been many similar but distinct institutional types over 
history. We have very few such resources in the case of many new international 
and transnational institutions, some of which are the sole token of their type. 
 Especially for rarer institutions that are not tokens of an entrenched type 
like the state, it may also be the case that they change their features dramatically 
over time, including their purpose. The European Union has become a robust, 
almost state-like institution but it began as a common market for specific goods. 
We could theorize the legitimacy of each time-slice of the institution but we 
should also concern ourselves with more liminal moments, especially because the 
EU is still affecting people’s lives even in its liminality. The state’s features are so 
worrying, and the purpose so demanding, that many possibilities for institutional 
change are in some ways normatively closed to us. When we consider institutions 
beyond the state, though, such change is a much more persistent feature that 
requires our attention.  
In addition, we often want to work from purpose to other features rather 
than, as in the case of sociologically identified institutions like the state, from 
other features to purpose. Consider a purpose that we have not yet attempted to 
undertake. At that point the question concerns institutional design: given our 
purpose, what other features must the institution have or lack in order to be 
legitimate? The above strategy also presumes that the other features will 
importantly limit the purposes under question because otherwise the theorizing 
won’t make any headway. For an institution with state-like features, the prima 
facie case is heavily against its legitimacy and so theorizing legitimacy involves 
trying to find a potentially legitimating purpose. For more common, benign 
institutions, the prima face case supports legitimacy, so theorizing is more 
focused on what purposes (and other features) are delegitimating.  
 Further, often we do not want to disaggregate institutional purpose from 
other features as I have so far been doing. For often we are not concerned with 
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institutions defined by their features independent of purpose but with institutional 
wholes that include purposes. Here institutional purpose is not a hypothetical posit 
of the theorist but is part and parcel with the sociological description. For 
example, it makes sense to ask: is the United Nations, given these features 
including this stated purpose, legitimate here and now? To answer this question, 
we do need some idea of whether the purpose in question is justifying but we 
identify the purpose by the fact that it actually is the purpose of an extant 
institution rather than by its justificatory role. We may not need to identify a 
hypothetical justifying purpose at all to say that this extant purpose cannot justify 
the institution as it exists.  
Identifying an institutional purpose could be the starting point of our 
theorizing, the goal, or something in between. How purpose matters for 
legitimacy depends in part on the variety of ways that judgments of legitimacy are 
deployed. 
 
IV. Extant Purpose 
 
Often we want to work with extant purpose, i.e. what purpose a particular 
institution undertakes as a descriptive, not prescriptive, matter. This matters most 
clearly when we ask whether an institution’s extant purpose matches a previously 
identified justifying purpose or when we ask whether a particular institution with 
this specific extant purpose is legitimate without a fully developed theory of 
legitimacy for that institution in hand. There are at least four problems when 
considering extant purpose: the identification, multiple purposes, contestation, 
and diachronicity problems. They are more pressing in cases beyond the state but 
arise for theorizing state legitimacy as well.  
 The first question is how we identify the extant purpose in order to 
compare it to the justifying purpose. This may not seem like much of a problem: 
many institutions profess to undertake a specific purpose, for example as 
articulated in mission statements. The United Nations provides a good example. 
Article 1 of its charter explicitly lays out four purposes: (1) to maintain 
international peace and security, (2) to develop friendly relations among nations, 
(3) to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems and in 
promoting respect for human rights, and (4) to be a centre for harmonizing the 
actions of nations for these common ends (Charter 1945). When looking at the 
activities of the UN, we can see how many of its actions align with these purposes 
and how its many subagencies often take pains to explain how their activities 
forward these aims. It is plausible to accept that these are actually the UN’s 
purposes. Yet it would be exceptionally naïve to simply accept the professed 
purpose of any given institution.  
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The Constitution of the Ku Klux Klan declares that the organization 
desires “to promote patriotism toward our Civil Government; honorable peace 
among men and nations; protection for and happiness in the homes of our people; 
manhood, brotherhood, and love among ourselves, and liberty, justice and 
fraternity among all mankind’ (Constitution 1921). Yet it is clear that this is not 
the extant purpose of the KKK. What it declares and what it does are two different 
things. (This makes sense for institutions with unpopular and impermissible 
extant purposes, for they will want to hide behind claims to permissible purposes 
to bolster their claims to legitimacy and to the protection legitimacy provides.) 
We need a way of identifying extant purpose beyond taking institutions at their 
word because some institutions do not explicitly profess any purpose and because 
sometimes there is a mismatch between professed purpose and extant purpose.15 
Call this the identification problem.  
 Second, institutions often have multiple extant purposes. This makes the 
relationship between the features of the institution and its legitimacy considerably 
more complicated on its own. But it also raises the possibility that multiple 
purposes may conflict.16 The UN, for example, is committed to both the 
promotion of peace and securing human rights. It structures its institutional 
norms, roles, and relations between them in order to better achieve its purposes. 
Yet some features that advance the prospects of peace undercut its ability to 
secure human rights. The fact that the United States and the Russian Federation 
each have a veto on the Security Council is important for ensuring their continued 
participation and so securing peace, but the veto allows each to protect themselves 
and their allies against UN action addressing human rights violations. Actual 
institutions often undertake a variety of tasks as a result of a variegated and 
complicated history and cannot be easily categorized in ways that lend themselves 
to straightforward evaluations of legitimacy. Call this the multiple purposes 
problem. 
 The multiple purposes problem and the identification problem interact. 
What we are mostly concerned with in the identification problem is identifying 
the constitutive purpose of the institution, the organizing principle that gives it 
shape. Part of the multiple purposes problem is that institutions might have 
multiple constitutive purposes. But many institutions also undertake purposes that 
are not constitutive of the institution. Here further complexities arise. Among the 
many extant purposes any institution might have, how do we distinguish 
constitutive from non-constitutive purposes? Under what circumstances does 
undertaking non-constitutive purposes matter for the legitimacy of an institution, 
which is mainly a matter of its constitutive purpose? A state may be made 
illegitimate if it undertakes any non-constitutive purposes, but other kinds of 
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institutions may not, with respect to some non-constitutive purposes but not 
others.  
 Third is the contestation problem. Institutional purpose, and the degree to 
which an institution is achieving its purpose, is often contested. Under some 
circumstances, particularly in the case of political institutions that have as their 
purpose the representation of all their subjects’ interests, contestation is not only a 
descriptive feature of the institution but is also both ineliminable and desirable. 
One of the justifying purposes of such institutions is accounting for, and indeed 
enabling, disagreement and contestation over the shape and structure of the 
institution itself. But if purposes and their achievement are contested, it is unclear 
how legitimacy judgments can coordinate practical stances towards institutions in 
the way required for such judgments to play their distinctive practical role. 
Finally, consider the diachronicity problem. Actual institutions change 
over time and their purposes can change as well. How do we identify the extant 
purpose of an institution when that very thing may be changing over time? Does 
the fact that an institution had some purpose in the past, and so was shaped by that 
purpose, matter for its legitimacy now, even if it has changed (e.g. the United 
States government and white supremacy)? Do we take into account the 
improvement of extant purpose over time? Do we take into account the possibility 
of reform in the future? These issues are especially important in light of the 
practical purpose of legitimacy judgments, which are supposed to coordinate our 
practical stance with respect to institutions. Our practical stance over time is made 
more complicated by changing institutional purpose. 
One way to address these problems would be to articulate some sort of 
process by which we could, for example, force institutional participants to commit 
themselves to a particular purpose. Ultimately, however, while these problems 
complicate our judgments of legitimacy, I do not think they are problems that can 
be solved. The features of institutions that give rise to these problems are 
ineliminable: their historical nature, their persistence across time and 
responsiveness to changing contexts, their inclusion of a wide range of individuals 
under conditions of reasonable disagreement, and so on.  
These problems also arise out of the tensions between various normative 
and evaluative standards that we need to use to analyze institutions and our 
relationships to them. Sometimes we are concerned with making new institutions, 
sometimes our relations to extant institutions, sometimes reforming institutions 
from the outside, sometimes from the inside. These concerns will weight various 
features of institutions differently as they consider the various goods and rights of 
institutions under various presentations. Legitimacy is relevant to all these 
questions in different ways, as are other modes of evaluation. Any “solution” to 
these problems will not be a matter of constructing an institution that avoids them 
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but of applying a more capacious and suitable theory of legitimacy to institutions 
as we find them. 
 
V. Conclusion: A Way Forward? 
 
Traditionally understood, legitimacy requires you to actively contribute towards 
the institution’s purpose because obedience (and other weaker forms of support) 
makes you a part of the coordinated action that constitutes pursuit of the purpose. 
When that purpose becomes unclear for any of a variety of reasons, the idea that 
you have an obligation to contribute towards that purpose is called into question. 
A right to the obedience and support of others is rightfully viewed as very 
demanding, impinging on self-determination and individual autonomy as 
obedience and support do, so the purpose at which obedience and support are 
directed needs to be clear and weighty. On my more minimalist approach, 
according to which legitimacy just is the right to function and nothing more, the 
correlated uptake of legitimacy is non-interference rather than contribution. A 
claim against interference even when it is unclear what purpose one is 
undertaking is much more palatable than a claim to active contribution and 
support when the purpose is unclear.  
Legitimacy, on my view, creates the space in our social practices for 
people to come together in organized groups and attempt to achieve certain goals 
and generate certain goods. We need such a space because the goals and goods of 
institutions are important and cannot be achieved otherwise; we need legitimacy 
to coordinate the normative boundaries of such a space because we disagree about 
what goods matter, to what degree they matter, and what (institutional) means are 
appropriate for pursuing them. This space is defined not by which institutions we 
should actively support but which we should not interfere with. 
Creating a space in this way is not only amenable to conflicts and 
questions about institutional purpose; part of the point of such a space is precisely 
to enable experimenting that is necessarily tentative and unsure. Thus the facts 
that an institution might not have a clear purpose, might undertake a variety of 
purposes with conflicting dictums, or might change its purpose over time, are not 
intrinsically problematic. It is understood to be part of why we need and employ 
legitimacy discourse as a distinct sort of normative evaluation.  
On my view, legitimacy judgments answer a very specific and very 
fundamental question: do we have to allow this institution to continue? We can 
coherently answer in the positive even when the problems of institutional purpose 
arise. Consider the identification problem. If we look at an institution, how it 
functions, the effects it has, and so on, we may not be able to glean its extant 
purpose. But this is not a fatal blow for its legitimacy on my view because it may 
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be entitled to non-interference. If the means it uses are not objectionable and if it 
has few (or no) negative effects, then the fact that we don’t know what it’s for is 
not necessarily problematic. But it is hard to see how this could be true when we 
understand legitimacy to correlate to duties of obedience and support. Parallel 
points can be made of the other problems: a more minimalist theory of legitimacy 
of the sort I prefer makes space for accounting for—and even encouraging—
complications of institutional purpose, while theories that require active support 
encounter problems. All I can do here is gesture towards these arguments. 
To conclude: institutional purpose matters for legitimacy in a variety of 
ways. Whether an institution undertakes a morally impermissible, merely 
permissible, or mandatory purpose matters because it changes the justificatory bar 
for the institution’s right to function in complex ways. Generally speaking, 
institutions with impermissible purposes have the least normative leeway while 
institutions with a mandatory purpose have the most. This leeway sets the bar for 
how other features of the institution matter for its legitimacy: an institution with a 
mandatory purpose may be able to use harmful or otherwise impermissible means 
to achieve its purpose, for example.  
Institutional purpose is also more complicated once we move beyond the 
state. For institutional types that are less well-defined and less entrenched in our 
actual world, we have more questions about purpose. An institution’s purpose 
may change over time, it may be difficult to identify the actual purpose(s) of an 
institution, these purposes may be contested, and may even conflict. We are 
concerned with the legitimacy of actual institutional tokens because we want to 
know how we relate to the institutions that shape our lives. As such, institutional 
purpose has a variety of roles to play other than as a hypothetical justificatory 
purpose for an institutional type, the role it plays most prominently in theorizing 
the state. Due to this, it pays to directly theorize institutional purpose and how it 
matters for legitimacy as I have here. These considerations can then be combined 
with our theorizing of other institutional features and how they matter for 
legitimacy to come to a more plausible and general theory of legitimacy for 
institutions of all kinds, in every circumstance we encounter them. 
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 																																																								1	See	Erman	(forthcoming)	for	a	recent	attempt	to	work	some	similar	issues	out	in	the	context	of	particular	political	purposes.	2	 Many	 institutions	 also	 address	 rules	 to	 “outsiders”	 or	 non-members;	political	institutions	are	a	prime	example	of	this.	However,	my	point	here	is	to	define	the	core	of	what	it	means	to	be	an	institution	and	institutions	are	 defined	 by	 the	 rules	 that	 define	 institutional	 roles	 and	 regulate	 the	activities	 of	 members.	 The	 next	 step	 is	 important	 for	 the	 subclass	 of	institutions	 that	 claim	 to	 bind	 outsiders	 in	 a	 particular	way,	 but	 not	 for	institutions	in	general.	3	 Normative	 standing	 is	 a	 set	 of	 Hohfeldian	 advantages	 and	 disadvantages	(Hohfeld	1919).	
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																																																																																																																																																							4	Thus	it	will	not	do	to	reduce	an	institution’s	purpose	to	a	description	of	its	actual	functions.	We	need	the	purpose	to	describe	the	institution	itself,	but	also	 to	 identify	 a	 mismatch	 between	 purpose	 and	 how	 it	 functions	 in	practice,	which	may	 itself	matter	 for	 legitimacy.	 Compare	Buchanan	 and	Keohane	 (2006,	 p.	 422)	 on	 institutional	 integrity.	 Even	 further,	 we	 are	often	 concerned	 with	 the	 prospects	 for	 reform	 when	 we	 consider	 an	institution’s	legitimacy	and	having	a	purpose	that	may	not	be	met	but	can	be	 a	 guide	 for	 effective	 reform	 will	 matter	 as	 well.	 Thanks	 to	 an	anonymous	reviewer	for	pushing	me	to	clarify	this.	5	 This	 can	 apply	 to	 sub-units;	 for	 example,	 on	 legislatures,	 see	 Waldron	(2016,	e.g.	p.	154).	6	 This	 example	 shows	 the	 contrast	 with	 the	 historical	 approach	 to	individuating	institutions.	To	my	mind	these	distinct	individuation	criteria	are	 simply	 useful	 in	 different	 contexts;	 neither	 captures	 the	 “real”	institution.	7	 The	 right	 to	 non-interference	 is	 the	 core	 of	 the	 right	 to	 function	 but	depending	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 institutions’	 functioning,	 this	 may	 well	entail	 further	 normative	 advantages,	 as	 mentioned	 in	 Adams	 (2018).	Thanks	 to	 an	 anonymous	 reviewer	 for	 pressing	me	 to	 clarify	 this	 issue.	The	 important	 point	 here	 is	 that	 legitimacy	 necessarily	 and	 minimally	includes	this	element,	and	that	is	enough	to	consider	how	purpose	matters	for	 the	 stringency	 of	 the	 requirements	 we	 would	 put	 on	 an	 institution	achieving	this	status.	Note	also	that	the	correlative	duty	not	to	interfere	is	only	the	duty	that	correlates	to	legitimacy;	members,	outsiders,	and	others	may	all	well	be	under	a	variety	of	other	duties	and	in	general	relate	to	the	institution	in	a	variety	of	ways	due	to	other	factors.		8	 All	 institutions	 depend	 on	 free	 acceptance	 by	 some	 core	 group	 of	participants.	 Some	 institutions,	 most	 notably	 states,	 also	 coercively	impose	 roles	 on	 people.	 This	 is	 a	 hugely	 complicating	 matter	 for	 the	legitimacy	of	such	institutions	that	prima	facie	defeats	the	positive	case	I	just	outlined.	9	Thanks	to	an	anonymous	reviewer	for	pressing	me	on	this	question.	10	This	is	(at	least	implicitly)	considered	throughout	this	special	issue,	including	by	Scherz	and	Zysset,	Christiano,	and	especially	Schmelzle.	11	 This	 is	 not	 to	 endorse	 a	 pure	 libertarian	 baseline	 for	 evaluating	institutional	 legitimacy.	 For	 example,	 we	 may	 have	 good	 reasons	 for	forbidding	certain	types	of	economic	institutions	because	of	the	effects	of	allowing	 the	 type,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 any	 given	 token	 might	 be	unobjectionable	on	its	own.	
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																																																																																																																																																							12	For	example,	in	January	of	2017	the	German	Constitutional	Court	decided	not	to	ban	the	neo-Nazi	NPD	party	on	the	grounds	that	it	was	ineffective.	Thanks	to	a	reviewer	for	bringing	this	example	to	my	attention.		13	This	strategy	is	employed	whether	one	thinks	that	ultimately	the	outcomes	of	the	state	matter	most	for	its	legitimacy	or	the	process	by	which	the	state	comes	about	(for	example	by	consent)	matters	most.	For	even	in	the	latter	case,	 the	 question	 is	why	 people	would	 consent	 to	 the	 state	given	 some	understanding	 of	 what	 the	 state	 is	 for,	 especially	 because	 no	 plausible	account	relies	on	actual	extant	consent;	theories	of	tacit	and	hypothetical	consent	 need	 to	 reconstruct	 what	 counts	 as	 consent	 and	 what	 is	 being	consented	to.	Thanks	to	an	anonymous	reviewer	for	pushing	me	to	clarify	this.	14	It	may	not	even	work	in	those	cases	(Sangiovanni	2013,	p.	221).	15	Furthermore,	even	sincere	statements	of	institutional	purpose	can	have	a	variety	of	aims	(Lang	and	Lopers-Sweetman	1991).			16	See	Pavel,	this	issue,	for	consideration	of	the	trade-offs	between	pursuing	different	goals	in	international	law.	
